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ABSTRACT
Online manipulation of information has become more prevalent
in recent years as state-sponsored disinformation campaigns seek
to influence and polarize political topics. While we are aware that
these disinformation campaigns exist, detecting their online pres-
ence is still difficult. Previously, researchers have proposed detect-
ing disinformation campaigns on Twitter by looking for specific
coordination patterns amongst their users (e.g., sharing the same
hashtag in a short time frame). The problem with this approach,
however, is that while the proposed coordination patterns may have
been unique to the studied disinformation campaigns, the patterns
have not been thoroughly validated against non-random samples
or across a diverse set of campaigns. As such, we examine the use-
fulness of these coordination patterns for identifying the activity of
a disinformation campaign from other legitimate Twitter activity.
We do this by rigorously testing the proposed coordination pat-
terns on a large-scale dataset of ten state-attributed campaigns and
various benign Twitter communities that are likely to coordinate
and share information amongst themselves. Our results show that
such patterns have significant limitations. First, coordination in
Twitter communities is not uncommon, especially when the online
world is reacting to real-world news (e.g., Brexit, US impeachment
trials). Second, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we found that polit-
ical bodies noticeably increased their coordinated Twitter activity.
Such an unexpected surge in coordination worsens the trade-off be-
tween usability and rate of detection. To identify most of the benign
activity during the pandemic, the classifier misses nearly 25% of
disinformation activity. Conversely, if the classifier achieves a high
rate of detection for malicious coordination, it misclassifies 46%
of legitimate coordinated activity. In doing this meta-analysis, we
show that although coordination patterns could be useful for detect-
ing disinformation activity, further analysis is needed to determine
the community’s intention.
1 INTRODUCTION
The many forms of social media allow for the rapid and widespread
dispersion of information. Whereas traditional channels for news
were unidirectional, the open and participatory nature of these
online worlds allows for information to be discovered and delivered
faster than ever before. This change has been largely beneficial,
allowing distant friends simple ways to reconnect, job seekers to
learn information about potential opportunities, and special interest
groups to easily come together.
Unsurprisingly, the source, provenance, and veracity of such
information are often difficult to determine. State-sponsored actors,
* These authors contributed equally.
operating disinformation campaigns, exploit the swift and decen-
tralized nature of modern social media to inject false or intentionally
misleading information to manipulate and polarize public opinion.
In response, many researchers have proposed a range of detection
techniques [10, 12, 28, 37, 38], with recent efforts to identify coor-
dination networks drawing significant attention because of their
relatively high reported accuracy [26, 27]. Unfortunately, these so-
lutions do not adequately consider the environment in which they
would be deployed, making their practical utility unknown. Specif-
ically, these techniques focus on detecting single accounts when
disinformation campaigns rely on coordination to push a message
and, when coordination is considered, it is unclear whether such
patterns extend to other disinformation campaigns. Finally, even if
they do extend to such campaigns, the coordination patterns are
tested against trivial baselines that are likely to have little-to-no
coordination. Given these shortcomings, it is unclear to what extent
these coordination patterns are useful in detecting the activity of
disinformation campaigns in a real setting.
In this paper, we aim to address the shortcomings mentioned
above by performing the most extensive study to date of the char-
acterization of coordination patterns used by disinformation cam-
paigns. Primarily, we focus on determining to what extent previous
network-based coordination metrics are useful in detecting disin-
formation campaign activity when compared against real-world
benign communities found on Twitter. By better understanding the
environment in which the proposed coordination patterns will be
deployed, we gain insight into how useful they will be for detecting
disinformation campaigns. We argue that comparing coordination
patterns of disinformation campaigns against communities found
on Twitter better represents the disinformation detection problem
since Twitter communities likely share more characteristics with
disinformation campaigns than random accounts. Namely, both
disinformation campaigns and Twitter communities are composed
of users that 1) share similar interests, and 2) are likely to coordi-
nate amongst themselves to push a message to the online world,
whether with malicious or benign intent. By making this compari-
son of coordination patterns, we observe the following findings:
• Largest Disinformation Detection Meta-analysis: We
measure the effectiveness of previously proposed coordina-
tion patterns as a way to uncover disinformation campaigns
on Twitter by examining over 51 million tweets from 10
state-attributed campaigns and 4 communities with varying
levels of benign coordination.
• CharacterizeCoordinationPatterns ofDisinformation
Campaigns: Communities with strong ties (especially po-
litical ones) can coordinate in ways indistinguishable to a
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network analysis-based classifier from disinformation cam-
paigns, particularly around major events (e.g., US State of
the Union address, elections).
• Case Study on COVID-19 and Message Coordination:
Our analysis shows that political coordination increases dur-
ing massively disruptive global events, which is also when
disinformation campaigns are likely to be deployed. Unfor-
tunately, this unexpected surge of increased activity makes
it easier for content polluters to share untrustworthy infor-
mation undetected.
Our last contribution, in particular, is worrisome as it is during
the moment of crisis [32] where factual information is needed
the most, yet we demonstrate that it is harder for these tools to
classify disinformation correctly. Finally, we note that research in
disinformation campaigns is usually carried out by performing a
forensic analysis on one or two specific campaigns at a time. We
approach disinformation research from a broader perspective to
better characterize generalizable coordination patterns.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
gives background on disinformation from a theoretical standpoint;
Section 3 explains the problem as well as the guiding questions for
the paper; Section 4 details our implementation and experimental
design; Section 5 provides our analysis and findings; Section 6
discusses the broader implications of our work; Section 7 examines
related work; and Section 8 includes our concluding remarks.
2 DATA-DRIVEN DISINFORMATION
Bad actors have exploited the open nature of social media sites as
a way to share disinformation with minimal effort. Unlike misin-
formation, which refers to the spread of inaccurate news without
ill-intent, disinformation seeks to deliberately spread misleading
or inaccurate news for deception and manipulation of a narrative.
As Starbird et al. discuss, bad actors have leveraged social media
disinformation as a conduit of manipulation to reach and deceive
millions of people in the online world as part of their Strategic Infor-
mation Operations (SIO) campaigns [31]. Many examples of these
campaigns have been discovered over the past decade. Some of
these can be attributed to state-sponsored manipulation [2]. Others,
however, target specific demonstrations (e.g., #BlackLivesMatter [1],
#WhiteHelmets [40]) and try to masquerade as grassroots move-
ments (i.e., astroturfing) to appear more genuine to other online
users. We used the term SIO throughout this paper to broadly re-
fer to any coordinated effort to spread inaccurate information and
influence public opinion, including specific disinformation efforts
such as astroturfing.
2.1 Operating a Disinformation Campaign
Disinformation campaigns can be carried out by multiple state and
non-state operators. The goal of these campaigns is to manipulate
a narrative and deliberately share misleading or confusing infor-
mation to the broader public while staying camouflaged. To reach
this goal, disinformation campaigns have successfully exploited
the open nature of social media sites. For example, previous re-
search discovered how Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA)
and Iran’s state-sponsored apparatus launched social media dis-
information campaigns attacking the United State’s presidential
election in 2016 [11, 25].
Disinformation campaigns are usually composed of hundreds
of accounts. As explained by Keller et al. [13], the operation of
these campaigns can be roughly described by the principal-agent
theory [18, 29], where the principal (campaign operator) conducts
the agents (user accounts) to perform some task (spread false in-
formation). In the principal-agent problem, an issue arises when
agents act for their own best interest, which is against the priorities
of the principal. While carrying out the task of spreading disinfor-
mation, the agents are capable of making a decision that may hurt
the camouflaging goal of the campaign operator by making use of
automation. As such, disinformation campaigns need to balance
the natural duality that exists between actively spreading mislead-
ing content and camouflaging their efforts to avoid detection. If
the agents are purely automated, then it is easier for more agents
to spread misleading messages. However, detecting the activity
becomes a more manageable task due to the behavioral artifacts
automation may leave behind (e.g., bulk account creation, temporal
patterns, account inauthenticity) [4, 8, 15]. Conversely, if human
agents controlled the accounts, thenmore resources are needed, and
fewer accounts may be available to spread the message. However,
even though there are fewer accounts, they have a higher chance
of being more authentic to the human users the campaign wishes
to manipulate, thereby camouflaging the disinformation campaign.
Regardless of the type of agents (automated or human), the
accounts that are part of the disinformation campaign may need
to coordinate amongst themselves to push the message they wish
to manipulate. This is seen by looking at the historical activity
of the accounts that post similar messages at around the same
time. It is this type of coordination that researchers have tried to
exploit as a way to detect if a disinformation campaign is being
executed [12, 26, 27].
In this work, we set out to analyze coordination found in Twitter
communities with the goal of characterizing the issues coordination-
based SIO detection tools may have. For an SIO detection tool, the
ultimate goal would be to flag a user community (i.e., a network of
accounts) that has spread disinformation in a coordinated fashion.
This problem can be broken down into two main subtasks: identi-
fying suspicious communities by looking at coordination patterns
amongst the members and identifying the intent of the messages
the accounts promote. The intent is usually determined by human
analysts that understand the context of how/when the messages
were shared. While some researchers have inferred the intent of
a campaign based on offline data (e.g., email leakages [14], court
filings [12]), such data sources are rarely available, making intent
identification an open problem. We do not focus on the intent
of disinformation and leave it to the analysis of the intelligence
community. Instead, to arrive at our goal of carefully assessing
coordination-based SIO classifiers, we conduct a large-scale anal-
ysis of the coordination patterns found in Twitter SIO campaigns
using tweets from Twitter’s Information Operations Election In-
tegrity report [36] as well as tweets from political and non-political
Twitter communities that engage in legitimate coordination.
2
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we discuss the approach we take to characterize the
coordination patterns that can be found in SIO campaigns and how
they compare to other Twitter communities.
As mentioned earlier, researchers have looked into the task of
flagging suspicious coordinated activity in service of SIO detection
and have proposed discriminative patterns that appear to be charac-
teristic of disinformation campaigns [13, 27]. These patterns usually
rely on extracting network statistics of a graph, where nodes are
accounts and edges represent coordination between accounts. For
example, edges can be created when two accounts are tweeting
the same message or retweeting the same person (more details in
Section 4.1). While accounts that consistently participate in such
behavior may certainly seem suspicious, the proposed patterns have
only been tested against baseline activity of random Twitter users
weakly linked by the political relevance of their tweets [27] or against
no baseline activity at all [13]. We argue that the lack of carefully
chosen Twitter communities for vetting coordination classification
has failed to provide insight into how well these discriminative
patterns would perform in the Twitter ecosystem. We base this
argument on the assumption that weakly linked Twitter accounts
(e.g., random accounts sharing the same trending hashtag) are not
likely to coordinate amongst themselves. However, if the accounts
are linked by a common interest or goal (e.g., accounts belonging
to government officials of the same political party), then they are
likely to form a community amongst themselves and share news
about the community.1 Since the proposed patterns have yet to be
tested in a classification setting where the baseline communities are
likely to coordinate amongst themselves, it is unknown whether
the coordination patterns are useful for detecting SIO campaigns
or if they appear often in various Twitter communities. Therefore,
to assist with our end goal of characterizing coordination patterns
on Twitter as a means for SIO detection, we sought to answer two
quantitative and qualitative guiding questions:
RQ1: Can we train a binary classifier to distinguish between the
daily and weekly coordinated activity of the SIO campaigns
from other Twitter communities?
RQ2: How is the classifier affected by an unexpected surge of
activity that causes communities to disseminate more infor-
mation?
RQ1 is concerned with measuring the ability of a classifier that
uses coordination patterns to distinguish the activity of Twitter SIO
campaigns from legitimate coordination.2 Our original hypothesis
was that without additional context, these patterns are not discrimi-
native enough to distinguish legitimate coordination within various
closely linked communities from SIO campaign coordination. We
show in Section 5 that this hypothesis is only partially correct:
while a sufficiently powerful classifier is able to successfully iden-
tify coordination patterns from some of the baseline communities, it
tends to confuse SIO-like activity exhibited by other communities.
1We consider a disinformation campaign to be a community since the accounts that
compose it share similar interests.
2For this paper, legitimate coordination refers to the coordination found in our Twitter
community baselines. We address them as legitimate since Twitter has not suspended
the accounts.
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Figure 1: Looking at the coordination patterns of a campaign
at specific time periods can reveal “events” where the cam-
paign pushes their messages. This information is lost when
looking at the coordination patterns of a campaign as one
network based on their full activity history.
RQ2 stems from recent observations that, due to the COVID-19
pandemic, governments (and other communities) have had to in-
crease the rate of information dissemination (both politically moti-
vated and health-related). This type of event brings massive par-
adigm shifts that cause predictive models trained on past data to
fail, which is exactly when such tools are most needed to remove
content polluters in real-time and at scale.
3.1 Classifying Coordinated Activity
To answer the questionsmentioned above, we set up ameta-problem
that focuses on detecting if the coordinated activity of a community
can be classified as being SIO or non-SIO. Given a community, we
train a binary classifier to predict if activity within a time period
originates from an SIO campaign (positive class) or not (negative
class) by solely looking at the networks generated by coordination.
There are two important distinctions to discuss about the pro-
posed meta-problem. First, this detection problem is not the same as
bot detection, which is a more clearly defined classification problem
(determining if an account is a human or robot) without issues of
determining intent, and is more thoroughly studied [28, 38]. Sec-
ond, rather than flagging accounts, we focus on flagging suspicious
coordinated activity. We consider activity classification, rather than
account detection, because SIO campaigns are often coordinated
efforts that involve many accounts which arguably leave traces that
can be detected with network analysis techniques [13, 27].
We classify a community’s Twitter activity by following similar
steps taken by other researchers, in that we use network analysis to
extract specific coordination patterns [13, 26, 27]. However, instead
of using the entire history of a community’s tweets to generate one
monolithic coordination network, we generate multiple networks
by looking at daily or weekly activity (Figure 1). Daily activity of
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Campaign (source→ target) Accounts Total Tweets
Tw
itt
er
SI
O
China→ Hong Kong 5.2K 13.85M
Iran→ Geopolitics 4.2K 4.29M
Russia (IRA)→ USA 3.8K 9.69M
UAE→ Qatar/Yemen 3.7K 1.33M
Iran→ USA 3.1K 5.79M
Venezuela→ Venezuela 987 8.95M
Ecuador→ Ecuador 787 700K
Venezuela (commercial)→
Venezuela
611 1.55M
UAE/Egypt→ Qatar/Iran 240 214K
Catalonia→ Spain 77 10.4K
Ba
se
lin
es UK Parliament (political) 568 1.52M
US Congress (political) 527 1.47M
Academics (non-political) 818 1.34M
Random (non-political) 543 1.21M
Table 1: High level statistics of the Twitter disinforma-
tion campaigns and manually collected political and non-
political communities used in our classifier analysis.
SIO has also been studied in the context of a campaign targeting
the 2012 South Korean presidential election [12]. We define daily
coordination as a set of coordination networks where all network
edges represent coordination between accounts that occurred on
the same day. Coordination at the weekly level is considered by
aggregating all of the daily coordination networks within a week,
which consists of keeping the unique set of accounts from that
week and taking the union of all of the edges from each day.
Viewing the coordination of a community as time slices, rather
than as a single time-independent network, can help interpret why
having a monolithic view of a community may lead to misclas-
sification. Notice in Figure 1 that a coordination network made
using the activity within a specific time period is a subgraph of
the coordination network generated based on the entire history
of the community. While it may seem like our classification setup
ignores temporal dependencies within SIO campaigns that span
across multiple days or weeks, characterizing these temporal pat-
terns to develop such a detection system is left as a promising
direction for future works.
3.2 Datasets
In this section, we discuss how we collected the ground truth Twit-
ter activity for SIO campaigns as well as the four baseline com-
munities. We use the coordination networks extracted from these
communities as a way to understand if previously proposed co-
ordination patterns are a unique structure to SIO campaigns. We
acknowledge that SIO campaigns also exist in other online plat-
forms (e.g., Facebook, Reddit). We chose to base our analysis on
Twitter since many detection tools have already been proposed
for this platform, and Twitter also provides SIO-related data to the
open public for research purposes.
3.2.1 Twitter SIO Campaigns. For our SIO ground truth, we ac-
cessed all the data archives of Twitter’s Information Operations
Election Integrity reports [36] up to September 2019. Each data
archive contains all tweets, media shared, and descriptions of ac-
counts that were part of a potentially state-backed information
operation campaign. For each campaign, we grouped the archives
based on the state-sponsor attribution (source) Twitter provided
as well as which countries (targeted) were attacked by the SIO
campaign3 (e.g., Iran state-sponsored targeting the United States).
We did not consider campaigns from Saudi Arabia, Spain (source),
and Bangladesh as they contained too few accounts and tweets.
Such campaigns were short-lived and did not have enough activ-
ity to analyze. All coordination graphs (and features) mentioned
in Section 4.1 were generated based on this combination of data
archives in their respective source/target campaigns. The high-level
statistics of the SIO campaigns are shown in Table 1.
3.2.2 Legitimate Twitter Community Activity. To compare SIO activ-
ity to other potentially legitimate coordination present on Twitter,
we collected four community baselines that have varying levels
of coordination amongst their members by using the Twitter API
which provides an account’s most recent 3200 tweets. These four
baselines are broadly categorized as either political or non-political
Twitter communities. We make this categorization to characterize
the similarities/differences that SIO campaigns have to Twitter com-
munities that engage in politically-charged discussions and other
communities that mainly discuss non-political topics.
For the political baselines, we collected the Twitter activity of
accounts from the members of the United States Congress as well
as the Members of Parliament (MPs) in the United Kingdom. These
two baseline communities were chosen since their members are
likely to discuss political topics that have polarizing viewpoints as
well as coordinate amongst themselves to pass/support legislation.
The two non-political communities we collected were accounts
of academic/professional security researchers and a random set of
accounts. We chose this academic baseline as an example of a legit-
imate Twitter community since many of the members may show
coordinated behavior (e.g., tweet about a conference, promote a pa-
per) and are assumed to more limited political discussion. We claim
that our academic baseline is representative of other Twitter com-
munities composed of accounts that share a similar interest, such as
other academic fields or users that are fans of the same sports team.
In addition to the academics baseline, we collected a random set
of accounts as previous studies have done. We collect this control
baseline by first querying tweets that are part of a randomly chosen
trending hashtag, then randomly picking one account from the
results, and finally doing a random walk from account to account
based on whom they follow. This random baseline is expected to
have minimal (if any) shared interests or coordination. Statistics on
our set of baseline communities are provided in Table 1.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
We now discuss how we extract feature vectors from coordination
found in SIO campaigns and the baseline communities. We also
discuss the implementation details of our classifier.
3Exact mapping based on the archive to state-sponsored attribution can be found in
Appendix A.
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4.1 Network Generation and Feature
Engineering
Our methodology focuses on the coordination behavior of a com-
munity. Coordination of a community can be measured by mapping
the tweet activity to a network analysis problem where the nodes
are accounts and edges represent some prescribed coordination pat-
tern that may exist between two accounts. In our case, we consider
six coordination patterns that have been previously proposed as
indicators of SIO [13, 26, 27]:
• retweet: an account retweeting another account in the same
community [13, 27]
• co-tweet: two accounts tweeting (not retweeting) the same
content (url excluded) within a time threshold [13]
• co-retweet: two accounts retweeting accounts thatmay/may
not be part of the community within a time threshold [13]
• co-hashtag: two accounts tweeting the same hashtag within
a time threshold [27]
• co-mention: two accounts mentioning the same user within
a time threshold [27]
• co-url: two accounts sharing the same url within a time
threshold [27]
While some of the patterns mentioned above are common be-
haviors in Twitter, Keller et al. [13] argues that accounts tweet-
ing/retweeting messages with similar content within a short time
frame can be seen as suspicious activity, and so we use a time
threshold for all types except for the retweet networks. Retweeting
is a simple way to spread false information and, more generally,
to signal-boost a specific message. Time thresholds were not en-
forced for the retweet coordination pattern in either of the previous
studies [13, 27] and hence we follow suit. Conversely, two or more
tweets using the same hashtag may not necessarily mean that these
accounts are coordinating. However, if those accounts tweet the
same hashtag within a time threshold (e.g., 1 minute) of each other,
then the behavior starts to appear more suspicious. The timing is
important since short time between two messages with the same
content could mean automation or an individual controlling multi-
ple accounts. For all coordination patterns, the pattern is defined by
what they share and the time between messages (except retweet).
To generate the daily/weekly feature vectors that we use to train
the classifier, we first collect all the tweets from a community within
a given time period (e.g., day, week). Second, for each coordination
pattern mentioned above, we generate the coordination network
using the tweet content and time to determine which accounts
require an edge between them based on the specified coordination
requirements. Once the coordination networks are generated, we
extract the seven statistical properties mentioned in Table 2 for
each of the six networks that measure the amount of activity (e.g.,
number of nodes and edges) and the connectivity (e.g., average
connected component sizes, average node degrees). We concate-
nate all the high-level statistics into a 42-dimensional vector (seven
metrics for each of the six coordination networks) as the represen-
tation of the coordination activity of the community for a given
time period. Finally, we discard any daily/weekly feature vectors
consisting of all zeros (i.e., no coordination activity was observed
based on the six patterns we consider). These feature vectors are
used to train/validate the classifier discussed in Section 4.2.
Coordination Network Features
nodes # of nodes
edges # of edges
largest_cc Size of the largest connected component
mean_cc Avg. size of connected components
std_dev_cc Std. dev. of the sizes of connected components
mean_deg Avg. node degree
std_dev_deg Std. dev. of node degree
Table 2: The seven features extracted from each of the six
types of coordination networks from the SIO campaigns
and baseline communities.We concatenate them to form 42-
dimensional feature vectors.
We note that results based on co-url activity are limited due to
link shortener/redirection services. While for the collected base-
lines, we can extract the exact links that were posted by the user,
the URLs that are part of the Twitter SIO archives do not have such
information present. Instead, a non-negligible amount of URLs are
shown as their shortened URL (e.g., bit*ly, dlvr*it). While the
correct approach to solve this issue is to look for the redirection
of the shorten URLs manually, we noticed that some end domains
no longer existed at the time of our analysis. Thus, instead of redi-
recting us to the originally posted URL, we get redirected to the
domain registrar (e.g., www*hugedomains*com). Basing edge cre-
ation on these misleading redirects could add non-existent edges
to the network. As such, we decided to be conservative and use the
URLs found in the dataset instead of the redirected values.
4.2 Classifier Implementation
For the binary classifier, we use a Random Forest (RF) [3] with
100 trees implemented using scikit-learn [24]. RFs are widely con-
sidered to be a strong baseline classifier and have recently been
employed for bot detection [41] and disinformation website detec-
tion [10] at scale. Compared to deep learning approaches, RFs learn
similar highly nonlinear decision boundaries but produce more
interpretable results, are more robust to unnormalized features, and
generally handle low to medium amounts of training data better.
We emphasize that although we are interested in assessing the abil-
ity of a classifier to separate Twitter SIO campaign coordination
from non-SIO coordination, our primary goal is to characterize the
coordination patterns found in our datasets, which leads us to favor
interpretability over maximizing classifier performance.
The question arises of how to properly evaluate the classifiers
for our study. Our proposed solution is to consider the classifier
performance at two distinct decision boundaries. First, to fully char-
acterize model performance at all decision boundaries, we show
precision-recall (P-R) curves, which are better suited for imbalanced
datasets than receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. Then,
we assess the classifier when labels are decided by majority voting
across the ensemble of 100 trees (Voting). This is the standard deci-
sion rule for RFs, and generally trades off precision (P) and recall
(R) quite well. However, to reflect the desire of a low number of
false positives, we also propose to show classifier performance at a
5
high threshold so that the classifier achieves a precision of 0.975
(P-Threshold). Note that this value is assumed by the authors, and
we use it to simulate an acceptable number of false positives for
our problem. The practice of evaluating classifiers by examining
relevant score thresholds has also recently been used in a bot detec-
tion meta-analysis to highlight a severe false positive problem [28].
We can also provide some context for choosing a precision of 0.975
with the following example from our dataset. Suppose that for 350
instances of non-SIO daily activity and 500 instances of SIO daily
activity the SIO discovery rate is 0.96. Then a model that achieves P
= 0.975 or better can have no more than 12 false positives. Precision
is sensitive to the number of true instances of SIO activity in the
dataset, and although our dataset is not reflective of the unknown
distribution of non-SIO to SIO activity in the real-world, note that if
we reduce the amount of SIO instances by 10% to 450 and maintain
the discovery rate, the number of allowed false positives at P =
0.975 will decrease to 11.
We note that we do not use PR-AUC or ROC-AUC scores to
quantify model performance in this study, and instead report F1
scores computed with the two aforementioned decision rules. AUC
scores average over many decision thresholds and can overestimate
model performance [28]. Also, AUC scores are useful for comparing
competing models and checking whether a model can successfully
rank a majority of positive samples higher than negative samples.
Based on visualizations of the data that we show in Figure 3, it can
be seen that much of the non-SIO data should be easily classifiable
by the RF; ROC-AUC scores are less informative when the overall
true negative rate (TNR) is already expected to be high.
To train our RF classifier, the daily and weekly coordination
network feature vectors extracted from the ten SIO campaigns (all
assigned a label of 1) and four baseline communities (all assigned a
label of 0) are combined into training and validation sets for cross-
validation (CV) in the following way. For each campaign and base-
line, we sort chronologically the days/weeks containing non-zero
amounts of coordination and set aside the first 85% of days/weeks
for training and the latter 15% for validation. We split the data
temporally to simulate a realistic scenario of having to use past
data to predict new coordination activity, and choose to use only
the last 15% days/weeks for validation as most of the datasets dis-
play increasing amounts of coordination over time (see Section 5.1).
We individually split each of the four baseline communities into
non-overlapping time periods for training and validation; the split
occurs on 2019-2-27 for UK Parliament, 2019-3-6 for US Congress,
2019-10-26 for Random, and 2018-9-28 for Academic. The valida-
tion set consists of the days between these dates and 2020-2-29; we
reserve all days of political community activity after 2020-3-1 to use
as a held-out set for the COVID-19 case study. We perform 10-fold
cross-validation four times, holding out one of the four baseline
communities to validate each time. For each fold, we train on five
randomly selected SIO campaigns and three baseline communities
and validate on the held out baseline community as well as on two
randomly selected SIO campaigns not observed during training
(this way we approximately maintain a 4:3 ratio of positive to neg-
ative labels during training and validation). Altogether, we train
240 models by considering 1, 5, and 10 minute coordination time
thresholds (Section 4.1), and daily and weekly coordination aggrega-
tion. We refer to models by the held-out baseline community it was
validated on (e.g., “UK Parliament” is a model trained on US Con-
gress, Academics, and Random coordination activity as well as five
randomly selected SIO campaigns and validated on UK Parliament
along with two other randomly selected SIO campaigns).
In total, from the 51.9M tweets across all disinformation cam-
paigns and baseline communities, 281K coordination networks were
generated to represent daily coordination activity.4 Computing
these networks took 3 days on a 40 core/512GB RAM server.
5 ANALYSIS
To answer the research questions posed in Section 3, we conduct a
series of empirical studies. First, we qualitatively characterize how
coordination changes in communities. Then, to answer RQ1, we
measure the ability of our binary classifier to correctly identify the
daily/weekly coordinated tweet activity by the considered Twitter
SIO campaigns and baseline Twitter communities. We interpret
the trained models by visualizing the coordination feature vectors
using t-SNE [17] and discuss feature importance using SHAP plots
[16]. We address RQ2 by presenting a case study on COVID-19
Twitter activity collected from members of the UK Parliament and
the US Congress. Our case study shows how a massive global event
has lead to an increase in SIO-like Twitter coordination from polit-
ical communities, which in turn negatively impacts the ability of
classifiers to identify SIO campaigns.
5.1 Characterization of Coordination
5.1.1 Setup. Before we analyze the guiding questions mentioned
in Section 3, we first do a high-level characterization of the coordi-
nation found in both the SIO campaigns as well as our baselines. In
Figure 2, we show examples of the coordination patterns exhibited
by some of the SIO campaigns and baselines. We generated the
coordination networks for each pattern discussed in Section 4.1
using daily aggregation with a 1-minute time threshold. We then
counted how many accounts participated in each coordination pat-
tern within their respective communities in a given day (i.e., the
number of nodes in the coordination network). Note that each col-
umn represents the coordination patterns for one campaign, and
the y-axis of the columns are different. Due to space limitations,
we show the rest of the coordination patterns in Appendix A. Fur-
thermore, to check how separable SIO and non-SIO coordination
activity is, we visualize t-SNE plots of the training set feature vec-
tors corresponding to daily/ weekly aggregation at a 1-minute time
threshold in Figure 3. We found that PCA [35] was unable to pro-
duce an interpretable representation of the variety of coordination
activity in our data; t-SNE is a more expressive dimensionality re-
duction tool for visualizing high dimensional datain a 2-D plane.
The features can be colored by class label to help reveal similarities
across distinct classes in the dataset.
5.1.2 Key Results. We find that the usage of each type of coordina-
tion pattern differs from one community to the next. From Figure 2,
we can see that coordination in SIO campaigns appear to be more
orchestrated. For example, in the Iranian campaign (Figure 2(a)), the
community appears to make use of co-tweeting (yellow) in late 2015
but then stops soon after. They then switch to coordinating by using
4In addition to daily coordination networks, weekly networks are also generated by
including all edges in a 7-day time period.
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(d) Academics
Figure 2: Examples of coordination activity for four communities (two disinformation campaigns and two of the manually
collected baselines). Each community appears to have different behavior characteristics such as high levels of co-tweeting
(Venezuela (commercial) or diversity in employed coordination patterns (Iran). A variety of coordination patterns can be seen
more extensively in political communities (e.g., US Congress) than non-political (Academics), but both types of baselines show
increasing amounts of coordinated activity over time.
UK Gen. Elections '17
US SOTU '18
US SOTU '19
SIO
Political
Non-political
(a) Daily coordination activity
UK Gen. Elections '17
US SOTU '18
US SOTU '19
SIO
Political
Non-political
(b) Weekly coordination activity
Figure 3: Visualizing t-SNE plots of the training set coordination feature vectors for SIO campaigns and baselines (political
and non-political) shows that the feature vectors generally appear to be separable at (a) daily aggregation and even more so
with weekly aggregation (b). However, on days when a community is reacting to specific events (e.g., US SOTU addresses, UK
general election), coordination frompolitical communities blends inwith SIO-like activity. This can be clearly seen by looking
at baseline events (indicated by stars) that are near the vicinity of SIO activity, and by seeing that in b) the various weeks of
heavy political activity (e.g., US SOTU addresses) become even more dissimilar from other baseline activity.
low amounts of retweeting (red) and high amounts of co-retweeting
(green) for the majority of 2017. Conversely, coordination for the
Venezuela (commercial) campaign (Figure 2(b)) posted the same
message from each account (co-tweeting). These SIO campaigns
show relatively constant coordinated activity, whereas other SIO
campaigns (Appendix A) show different bursty behaviors (i.e., in-
termittent levels of high activity and little to no activity).
For the baseline communities, we can see that retweeting is the
most used coordination pattern. This is not surprising as retweeting
is one of the most common actions that a user can take on Twitter as
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it only takes one click. Additionally, accounts within a community
may desire to signal boost each other by retweeting if they share
similar goals (e.g., legislative or academic). The amount of coordi-
nation also varies for the baselines, with political communities (the
UK Parliament and the US Congress) showing more coordination
than our non-political communities (Random and Academics). Fi-
nally, we note that while co-tweeting patterns are minimal in all
of the baseline communities, some SIO campaigns rarely employ
co-tweeting, thereby preventing the use of only co-tweeting metrics
as a simple rule for identifying SIO activity.
Additionally, in Figure 3, we observe that the feature vectors of
coordinated activity appear to cluster into SIO, political, and non-
political for both daily and weekly coordination patterns. We first
note that days and weeks of low coordination activity are present
in the training sets for both SIO campaigns and the baselines. These
low activity days manifest in the t-SNE plots as tight, isolated clus-
ters where data points from all three clusters overlap. Another
noticeable aspect is that there are several isolated days/weeks of
political activity (green) that are spread through the SIO activity.
Many of these days turn out to correspond to events of note such
as the 2018 and 2019 US State of the Union (SOTU) addresses (we
investigate further in Section 5.3). The proximity of these polit-
ical days to SIO coordination feature vectors shows that during
community events, some baselines appear to have SIO-like activity
patterns. Finally, we find that increasing the temporal aggregation
from daily to weekly greatly increases the separation between non-
political and SIO coordination. While certain amounts of political
coordination now resemble neither non-political nor SIO activity
(2017 UK general elections in Figure 3(b)), other instances (2018
and 2019 US SOTU) appear even more strongly to be SIO activity.
5.1.3 Takeaways. As expected, coordination appears to be more
prevalent and orchestrated in SIO campaigns than in the baseline
communities. However, the type of coordination, as well as the
behavior based on it, differs for each campaign and community.
These variations can make it hard for detection mechanisms to
learn generalizable patterns to detect SIO-like activity, which is
worsened by the observation that the amount of coordination tends
to increase over time. Moreover, the activity from days where a
legitimate community reacts to a specific event appears to closely
resemble SIO-like coordination patterns.
5.2 RQ1: Coordination Activity Classification
5.2.1 Setup. Using the cross-validation data splits described in
Section 4.2, we now train all of the binary classifiers and analyze
their ability to distinguish daily/weekly coordinated activity from
our SIO and non-SIO Twitter communities. In Table 3, we show F1
(Voting) and F1 (P-Threshold) scores computed by averaging over
the 10 cross-validation folds, political communities (UK Parliament
and US Congress), and non-political communities (Academics and
Random) with 95% confidence intervals (CI) shown. For each of
the 10 folds, we evaluate F1 (P-Threshold) at the threshold corre-
sponding to P = 0.975. To select one model from the 10 folds for
displaying precision-recall curves, we compute the average PR-AUC
score across the 10 models and select the one whose PR-AUC score
is closest to the mean. We do this rather than selecting the model
that achieves the highest PR-AUC score across the 10 folds since we
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Figure 4: P-R curves for the daily / 1-minute and weekly / 1-
minute models that had a PR-AUC score closest to themean
PR-AUC across 10 folds. F1 scores at P = 0.975 are marked by
stars. a) We found that daily coordination aggregation per-
forms better than weekly aggregation at identifying polit-
ical community activity, but the recall at sufficiently high
precision allows nearly 20% of SIO activity to pass by unde-
tected (UK Parliament R = 0.83, US Congress R = 0.78). b)
Weekly aggregation is best for non-political communities,
with our classifier obtaining F1 (P-Threshold) scores of 0.99
for both non-political baselines. The sharp drop in F1 (P-
Threshold) score for the UK Parliament and US Congress
models between daily/weekly shows that relaxing the strict
false positive requirement is necessary to detect SIO activ-
ity using larger temporal aggregation; however, high false
positive rates severely degrade the usability of automated
detection tools.
observed that the best PR-AUC score consistently fell outside of the
95% CI of the mean, and is likely to overestimate the results. The
daily / 1-minute precision-recall curves are shown in Figure 4, with
the remainder of the curves shown in Appendix A. For a more fine-
grained examination of the performances, sensitivity vs. specificity
for the daily / 1-minute models is shown in Table 4.
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F1 (↑) Activity Political Non-political
Vo
tin
g
Daily / 1-min 0.91 (0.89, 0.92) 0.94 (0.92, 0.97)
Daily / 5-min 0.86 (0.84, 0.88) 0.92 (0.88, 0.96)
Daily / 10-min 0.83 (0.81, 0.86) 0.91 (0.86, 0.95)
Weekly / 1-min 0.89 (0.87, 0.91) 0.97 (0.95, 0.98)
Weekly / 5-min 0.83 (0.81, 0.85) 0.94 (0.91, 0.96)
Weekly / 10-min 0.80 (0.79, 0.82) 0.94 (0.91, 0.97)
P-
Th
re
sh
ol
d
Daily / 1-min 0.83 (0.76, 0.90) 0.94 (0.91, 0.98)
Daily / 5-min 0.62 (0.52, 0.72) 0.86 (0.75, 0.97)
Daily / 10-min 0.52 (0.40, 0.65) 0.91 (0.85, 0.97)
Weekly / 1-min 0.66 (0.55, 0.78) 0.99 (0.99, 1.0)
Weekly / 5-min 0.45 (0.31, 0.59) 0.98 (0.97, 0.99)
Weekly / 10-min 0.42 (0.28, 0.55) 0.98 (0.97, 0.99)
Table 3: 10-fold CV F1 scores. F1 scores are averaged across
10 folds with 95% (upper, lower) confidence intervals around
the mean estimate shown. F1 (P-Threshold) scores are eval-
uated at the threshold corresponding to P = 0.975 along the
P-R curve.
10-fold CV TPR / TNRP-Threshold
TPR / TNR
Voting
Political (daily / 1-min) 0.75 / 0.98 0.93 / 0.87
Political (daily / 5-min) 0.49 / 0.99 0.90 / 0.77
Political (daily / 10-min) 0.40 / 0.99 0.88 / 0.72
Table 4: TPR = true positive rate (recall), TNR = true negative
rate (specificity). Here, TPR measures the ability of the clas-
sifier to find all of the SIO instances. TNRmeasures the abil-
ity of the classifier to correctly identify coordination from
the US Congress (N = 361) and the UK Parliament (N = 367).
5.2.2 Key Results. The daily / 1-minutemodels all attain F1 (Voting)
scores greater than or equal to 0.91, and when increasing aggrega-
tion to weekly / 1-minute, the F1 (Voting) scores for non-political
communities increases to 0.97. Strikingly, the F1 (P-Threshold)
scores at weekly / 1-minute for non-political communities reach
0.99. Conversely, when moving from daily to weekly, the classifier
either has low recall when achieving the threshold on false posi-
tives for political communities (F1 (P-Threshold) = 0.66) or sacrifices
precision to maintain a high F1 score (F1 (Voting) = 0.89).
By requiring P = 0.975, the specificity for the political communi-
ties at daily / 1-minute is acceptable (TNR = 0.98) but the trade-off is
a lower recall (R = 0.75). On the other hand, using voting to decide
labels achieves a more balanced trade-off of specificity (TNR = 0.87)
and recall (R = 0.93), but a TNR of 0.87 does not reflect our desire
for a sufficiently low rate of false positives.
5.2.3 Takeaways. We conclude that by adequately tuning the deci-
sion threshold and using weekly aggregation, the RF classifier can
achieve near-perfect separation of non-political coordination from
SIO coordination. However, the same cannot be said about political
communities. While the F1 scores (both Voting and P-Threshold) for
the political communities appear high, there is still a false positive
problem when achieving desirable recall levels. More broadly, these
results show that disinformation detection based on network analy-
sis must balance effectiveness for usability. With a loose restriction
on the number of allowable false positives, a classifier can identify
almost all of the SIO activity, but such a system would be deemed
impractical as it would flag a high amount of benign activity. There-
fore, our response to RQ1 is that a classifier using only network
analysis features is unable to distinguish daily/weekly activity as
SIO or non-SIO at desirable levels for all Twitter communities.
We noticed that many of the errors causing the false positives sur-
rounded days/weeks, which contained significant political events
(see Section 5.3). We also note that increasing the time thresholds to
5 and 10 minutes tended to reduce model performance, suggesting
that the added coordination captured by higher time thresholds has
the effect of further blurring the line between legitimate coordina-
tion found in Twitter communities and SIO activity.
To further probe the classifier’s decision-making process, we
produced a SHAP summary plot of RF feature importances (Figure
5). As our focus is on assessing the broad use of network analysis
features for our detection task, we do not analyze the features
in further detail by examining e.g., partial dependence plots or
multicollinearity in this study. The classifiermostly relies on various
statistics of the retweet network to separate SIO and non-SIO data. A
high average node degree in the retweet network is a main indicator
of SIO activity, however. Other important coordination features
that strongly indicate similarity to SIO activity include the number
of nodes in the co-tweet network, as well as the average size of
connected components of the co-url and co-mention networks. Co-
tweeting rarely appears in the non-SIO training data, causing the
classifier to label almost all data points containing any amount of
co-tweeting as SIO. Overall, stronger connectivity amongst nodes
increases the likelihood that the classifier labels the activity as SIO.
5.3 RQ1: Examples of Misclassification
5.3.1 Setup. We now turn our attention to understanding why co-
ordination activity of legitimate communities can get misclassified
as SIO activity, due to the emphasis we place on minimizing false
positives. To do that, we look at the days that were consistently
misclassified by the daily / 1-minute models across each of the 10
folds in cross-validation. More concretely, we only consider days
in this analysis if they were misclassified across all CV folds. We
found 0 days from Academics, 9 days for Random, 16 days for the
US Congress, and 13 days for the UK Parliament. We then extract
all information from the tweets that were used to generate the co-
ordination network for that given day. Finally, we manually looked
at both the tweets that caused the misclassification to occur as
well as the news for that specific date that may have affected the
coordination patterns of the community.
5.3.2 Key Results. Unsurprisingly, the models that validated their
ability to classify non-SIO activity on non-political communities
did not make many misclassifications. Mainly, we noticed that the
coordination networks based on co-url and co-hashtag appeared to
be more active while other networks (e.g., retweet network) had
minimal (if any) activity. For the dates that were misclassified, we
9
Figure 5: SHAP feature importance (top to bottom). Retweet
network activity metrics are most informative for the clas-
sifier to separate SIO campaigns and baseline communities.
could not determine any specific event that caused the error. As
discussed in Section 5.2, by increasing the temporal aggregation to
weekly / 1-minute, the RF can reduce misclassifications to nearly 0.
Conversely, for the political baselines, we noticed that the mis-
classifications occur when the community is reacting to a specific
community event. For example, in the US Congress dataset, we saw
that the US Congress Twitter activity surrounding the impeach-
ment hearings of President Donald Trump was mostly misclassified
as having SIO-like coordination patterns. These misclassified dates
include the announcement of a formal impeachment inquiry [19],
many days during the testimonial hearings [21], and the House vote
to pass the Articles of Impeachment [20]. Furthermore, as Figure 3
demonstrates, the coordination pattern surrounding events like the
2018 and 2019 SOTU address appears similar to SIO coordination.
Indeed, the 2020 SOTU was also consistently misclassified. In Fig-
ure 6, we show the coordination activity as well as the generated
networks of US Congress during the SOTU address of 2020. Note
that highly coordinated tweet activity occurs at the same time as
the event is on the air.5 The UK Parliament was no different in re-
gards to misclassification. Many days misclassified included Prime
Minister Boris Johnson becoming the leader of the Conservative
Party, updates on the UK withdrawing from the European Union
(i.e., Brexit), or debates regarding the general elections for the UK.
5While misclassified day may be cause due to event, other days appear to be misclassi-
fied due to constant tweet activity throughout the whole day.
00:00
05-Feb
03:00 06:00 09:00 12:00 15:00 18:00 21:00
Time (UTC)
0
20
40
60
80
100
Tw
ee
t C
ou
nt
 
cohashtag
comention
coretweet
cotweet
courl
retweet
(a) Coordinated Tweet Activity
cohashtag comention
coretweet cotweet
courl retweet
(b) Coordination Networks
Figure 6: Example of a day in which the US Congress Twitter
activity was misclassified as resembling SIO-like coordina-
tion patterns. The misclassification is mostly attributed to
the US Congress reacting to the 2020 US State of the Union
address (note the UTC time). We show the tweet count for
tweets that were part of the coordination networks.
5.3.3 Takeaways. The findings above may have profound implica-
tions beyond the classification of coordinated community activity.
The coordination networks are subgraphs of the monolithic co-
ordination network generated on the entire activity of the whole
community. SIO community detection systems are likely to have
many false positives if they are based on monolithic networks that
naively aggregate over long time periods since legitimate com-
munities would appear as highly coordinated, even though the
coordination may only occur around community events, which are
expected to be common occurrences across Twitter. Information on
those events, however, is lost since the monolithic network ignores
the temporal nature of the activity.
5.4 RQ2: Case Study—Political Coordination
During the COVID-19 Pandemic
5.4.1 Setup. While conducting this study, we observed a shift in
the coordination patterns of the political communities around the
time the COVID-19 pandemic began to impact western countries
(late February 2020). This enabled us to conduct a unique case study
to test the generalization ability of our trained models in a novel
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March 1, 2020— TNRP-Threshold
TNR
Voting
UK Parliament (daily / 1-min) 0.68 0.45
UK Parliament (daily / 5-min) 0.8 0.31
UK Parliament (daily / 10-min) 0.7 0.26
US Congress (daily / 1-min) 0.92 0.64
US Congress (daily / 5-min) 0.97 0.42
US Congress (daily / 10-min) 0.79 0.45
Table 5: Classifier specificity/TNR on post-COVID-19 Twit-
ter activity for UK Parliament (N = 32) and US Congress (N
= 51). TNR = true negative rate.
environment; that of a global event that has required governments
to take drastic actions and assert varying levels of influence over
their populations.Arguably, this is when SIO campaigns could bemost
damaging, making detection critical.We test the daily UK Parliament
and US Congress models against UK Parliament and US Congress
Twitter activity collected via the Twitter API after 2020-3-1. We
average the specificity over the 10 CV models, using both the P
= 0.975 decision thresholds as well as voting, and compare the
specificity (Table 5) to the reported specificity from the pre-COVID-
19 validation sets (Table 4). The case study included 32 days for the
UK Parliament and 54 days for the US Congress baselines.
5.4.2 Key Results. When using voting, the ability of the daily /
1-minute model to classify UK Parliament activity after March 1 is
reduced significantly (TNR = 0.45) with better results for classifying
US Congress activity (TNR = 0.64). This is a stark contrast to the
cross-validation specificity scores reported earlier; the best pre-
COVID-19 average specificities for political communities are 0.98
(P-Threshold) and 0.87 (Voting) using daily / 1-minute, and the best
post-COVID-19 average specificities are 0.88 (P-Threshold) daily /
5-minute and 0.54 (Voting) daily / 1-minute. Effectively, the voting-
based classifier, which achieves the best pre-COVID-19 recall of 0.93,
has its specificity decrease by 33 percentage points (0.87→ 0.54) post-
COVID-19. The recall for the daily / 5-minute model pre-COVID-19
is just 0.49 (P-Threshold). We can attribute the low scores to the
increases in political coordination in March 2020. We visualize this
by showing the t-SNE plot of the daily feature vectors for political
communities during the COVID-19 pandemic along with the SIO
and political community training data (Figure 7). Almost all of
the days after 2020-3-1 are near other days of substantial political
coordination, such as the SOTU addresses. If it is allowable for
the model to miss 25% of SIO activity while maintaining low false
positives, the daily / 1-minute model (P-Threshold) can identify 80%
of legitimate political coordination during the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, this low recall score is likely ineffective for a practical
and scalable SIO detection system.
5.4.3 Takeaways. The increase in political coordination exhibited
by the US Congress and even more so by the UK Parliament due
to the COVID-19 pandemic is reflected by a corresponding sharp
decrease in our trained models ability to identify non-SIO coor-
dination. By increasing the detection threshold, the classifier can
UK Gen. Elections '17
US SOTU '18
US SOTU '19
SIO
Political (--March 5, 2019)
Political (March 1, 2020--)
Figure 7: COVID-19 t-SNE data visualization. The unex-
pected surge of activity from the UK Parliament and the
US Congress due to the COVID-19 pandemic makes it dif-
ficult to differentiate between SIO-like coordinated activity
and the governments online discussion.
somewhat identify political activity as non-SIO, but a broader dis-
cussion about an acceptable recall for detecting SIO activity must
be held. Note that in our training dataset, we have slightly more
positive labels than negative labels (4:3 ratio), which implies that
maintaining the P = 0.975 with a more imbalanced dataset where
the non-SIO labels dominate would lead to even lower recall scores.
Hence, in response to RQ2, we show that the extent at which such a
global event affects our network analysis-based classifier highlights
that bad actors that try to take advantage of time periods such as
these to deploy an SIO campaign are less likely to be detected.
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Limitations
While the SIO coordination patterns examined were previously
proposed [13, 27] and to some extent represent normal behavior
of Twitter users, other coordination patterns likely exist. For ex-
ample, a common behavior that may be heavily used by Twitter
communities—but is not included in our analysis—is sharing the
same image or video. We also note that our ground truth data for
SIO activity is based on discovered SIO campaigns Twitter has pub-
lished. Likely, many more SIO campaigns are still operating on
the Twitter platform. Some of the coordination patterns present in
those communities are likely unaccounted for by our analysis.
6.2 Coordination as a Spectrum
As we showed in our experiments, coordination is not a unique
phenomenon that only occurs in SIO campaigns. Each of the four
collected baselines shows varying levels of coordinated activity,
with political baselines exhibiting both SIO-like and non-SIO coordi-
nation patterns. Since other benign communities (e.g., governments,
political activists) likely share similar behaviors as our political base-
lines, it is essential to note that their SIO coordination activity should
be seen as a spectrum and not a binary state. Forcing a classifier to
11
make a binary decision between SIO and non-SIO based on coordi-
nation can lead to an overestimation of accounts that are part of
disinformation campaigns. These overestimations would flag the
activity of legitimate accounts as suspicious and possibly lock or
suspend them, thereby degrading the usability of Twitter.
6.3 Detection Outside the Closed World
We use the COVID-19 case study to illustrate two crucial problems
with deploying machine learning systems in the real world. First,
current machine learning techniques make a strong assumption
that the future will resemble the past. In adversarial environments
that are constantly changing, this assumption rarely ever holds.
Second, events that are inherently unpredictable pose significant
challenges for even anomaly-detection systems, which are trained
to identify abnormal data points, as examples of the “novel” data
points do not yet exist at training time [30]. This problem is akin
to the “hindsight is 20/20” expression which tells us that decisions
made in the past are easy to understand once we look back at
them but hard to justify as they are happening. We emphasize that
research into SIO detection must prioritize gaining insight over
improving the numerical results.
6.4 Future Work
In this work, we focus on separating the activity of Twitter commu-
nities, whether SIO campaigns or legitimate users, based on their
daily and weekly coordination patterns. While these time periods
give us insight into how coordinated a community is for a specific
day and week, they do not include information as to how their
activity changes. Future research in this field could expand into
finding ways to incorporate temporal dependencies into SIO coordi-
nation classifiers. By looking at the evolution of coordination, more
behavior patterns of SIO campaigns and Twitter communities may
emerge, such as cycling of accounts or measuring the burstiness or
continuous coordination fingerprint of a community.
7 RELATEDWORK
Disinformation campaigns have received much attention from var-
ious research disciplines since they play on human influence [2],
political messaging [33], and platform manipulation [40, 44, 45].
While online social media platforms like Twitter have presented
yet another landscape for the dissemination of disinformation, such
platforms have also served as a way to keep a historical record
that allows researchers to perform post-mortem analysis of the
measures taken by the campaign operators. By focusing on the ac-
tivity of accounts of one SIO campaign, researchers have been able
to infer various campaign characteristics such as: what political
leaning the community takes (e.g., left-leaning, right-leaning) [33],
the divisive content they share [43], their possible presence in other
platforms [33, 43, 44], the coordination efforts made by the commu-
nity [42], or influence [13]. More closely related to the work in this
paper, other researchers have also looked into cross-campaign com-
parisons to characterize various disinformation activities [23, 45].
While we use a similar dataset, we focus on explaining SIO coordi-
nation tactics rather than characterizing campaign content.
Identifying content pollution on social media has become a chal-
lenging problem due to the rapid and immense scale at which
information diffuses in real-time. As a result, there is an increased
interest in automating the moderation of such spaces using care-
fully designed algorithms [6, 7, 9, 34]. Such content moderation
can be done through bot detection systems like Botometer [37, 38]
or disinformation website detection systems like Disinfotron [10].
Additionally, network-based detection mechanisms have also been
used to uncover Sybil accounts that wish to abuse online plat-
forms [5, 39, 46]. Bot detection, which seeks to determine if an
account is a human or robot, does not necessarily suffer from SIO
detection challenges like identifying the intent behind a politi-
cal community’s motivations for coordinating. Notably, current
bot-detection methods are still lacking in that they exhibit high
false-positive rates [28], and recent studies have sought to improve
the generalization capabilities of detection systems by careful data
selection during training [41].
Though the bot detection problem involves flagging individual
accounts, other detection mechanisms focus on flagging networks
based on their behavior. Truthy [26, 27] is an example of an early
attempt at developing an automated system for detecting astro-
turfing campaigns. The primary function of Truthy is to flag net-
works of users extracted from Twitter as suspicious based on a
list of weak indicators. Once flagged, the final determination of
whether the coordinated user activity can be considered as astro-
turfing is left to end-users due to the difficulty of automatically
capturing intent. Though helpful, the binary classifier with features
designed to measure information network connectivity is trained
on a small dataset of individual hand-labeled networks obtained via
the Truthy web service [27]. Additionally, while Truthy provides
evidence that political astroturfing tends to contain patterns of
coordination, it lacks rigorous validation on large-scale datasets
with non-random legitimate coordination baselines for comparison.
Other recent developments in the automatic extraction of Twit-
ter communities likely to be engaged in astroturfing campaigns
have mainly focused on tweet coordination networks [12, 13, 22],
text-based analysis [12], and specific temporal patterns [22]. As we
set out to show in the current study, a careful examination of the
extent to which legitimate political communities coordinate reveals
that coordination network statistics are insufficient to distinguish
Twitter SIO campaigns from other instances of coordination.
8 CONCLUSION
Strategic Information Operations have exploited online social media
sources to deceive and manipulate online rhetoric. Detecting these
SIO campaigns, however, is still an open problem. Previous works
have suggested using coordination patterns that were present in
the specific disinformation campaign as a way to uncover other SIO
campaigns or compare disinformation to non-realistic baselines.
In this work, we address previous shortcomings by focusing on
answering a broader question: how generalizable are these patterns
and do they have any pitfalls as detection mechanisms. As our re-
sults show, coordination patterns on Twitter are not uncommon. In
fact, communities (specifically political ones) are likely to have co-
ordination patterns that are similar to those of SIO campaigns. The
analysis performed in this paper shows that coordination patterns
are not enough to detect these campaigns, and further analysis is
needed to gain more insight into disinformation coordination.
12
REFERENCES
[1] Ahmer Arif, Leo Graiden Stewart, and Kate Starbird. 2018. Acting the part: Exam-
ining information operations within# BlackLivesMatter discourse. Proceedings of
the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 2, CSCW (2018), 1–27.
[2] Alexandre Bovet and Hernán A Makse. 2019. Influence of fake news in Twitter
during the 2016 US presidential election. Nature communications 10, 1 (2019),
1–14.
[3] Leo Breiman. 2001. Random forests. Machine learning 45, 1 (2001), 5–32.
[4] Qiang Cao, Michael Sirivianos, Xiaowei Yang, and Tiago Pregueiro. 2012. Aiding
the Detection of Fake Accounts in Large Scale Social Online Services. In Pre-
sented as part of the 9th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and
Implementation (NSDI 12). 197–210.
[5] Qiang Cao, Xiaowei Yang, Jieqi Yu, and Christopher Palow. 2014. Uncovering
large groups of active malicious accounts in online social networks. In Proceedings
of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
477–488.
[6] Juan Echeverrï£¡ a, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Nicolas Kourtellis, Ilias Leontiadis,
Gianluca Stringhini, and Shi Zhou. 2018. Lobo: Evaluation of generalization
deficiencies in twitter bot classifiers. In Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference. 137–146.
[7] Manuel Egele, Gianluca Stringhini, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna.
2015. Towards detecting compromised accounts on social networks. IEEE Trans-
actions on Dependable and Secure Computing 14, 4 (2015), 447–460.
[8] Hao Fu, Xing Xie, Yong Rui, Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Guangzhong Sun, and En-
hong Chen. 2017. Robust Spammer Detection in Microblogs: Leveraging User
Carefulness. ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol. (2017).
[9] Robert Gorwa, Reuben Binns, and Christian Katzenbach. 2020. Algorithmic
content moderation: Technical and political challenges in the automation of
platform governance. Big Data & Society 7, 1 (2020), 2053951719897945.
[10] Austin Hounsel, Jordan Holland, Ben Kaiser, Kevin Borgolte, Nick Feamster, and
JonathanMayer. 2020. Supporting Early and Scalable Discovery of Disinformation
Websites. arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.07684 (2020).
[11] Twitter Election Integrity Hub. 2020. Election Integrity Hub. https:
//blog.twitter.com/enus/topics/company/2017/Update-Russian-Interference-
in-2016--Election-Bots-and-Misinformation.html
[12] Franziska B Keller, David Schoch, Sebastian Stier, and JungHwan Yang. 2017.
How to manipulate social media: Analyzing political astroturfing using ground
truth data from South Korea. In Eleventh International AAAI Conference on Web
and Social Media.
[13] Franziska B Keller, David Schoch, Sebastian Stier, and JungHwan Yang. 2020.
Political Astroturfing on Twitter: How to coordinate a disinformation Campaign.
Political Communication 37, 2 (2020), 256–280.
[14] Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E Roberts. 2017. How the Chinese govern-
ment fabricates social media posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument.
American political science review 111, 3 (2017), 484–501.
[15] Changchang Liu, Peng Gao, MatthewWright, and PrateekMittal. 2015. Exploiting
temporal dynamics in sybil defenses. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 805–816.
[16] Scott M Lundberg and Su-In Lee. 2017. A Unified Approach to Interpreting Model
Predictions. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30, I. Guyon,
U. V. Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fergus, S. Vishwanathan, and R. Garnett
(Eds.). Curran Associates, Inc., 4765–4774. http://papers.nips.cc/paper/7062-a-
unified-approach-to-interpreting-model-predictions.pdf
[17] Laurens van der Maaten and Geoffrey Hinton. 2008. Visualizing data using t-SNE.
Journal of machine learning research 9, Nov (2008), 2579–2605.
[18] Gary J Miller. 2005. The political evolution of principal-agent models. Annu. Rev.
Polit. Sci. 8 (2005), 203–225.
[19] National Public Radio (NPR). 2019. Pelosi Announces Formal Impeachment
Inquiry Into President Trump. https://www.npr.org/2019/09/24/763700264/
trumps-ukraine-call-may-be-game-changer-on-impeachment
[20] National Public Radio (NPR). 2019. President Trump Impeached By The House In
Historic Rebuke. https://www.npr.org/2019/12/18/789020525/president-trump-
impeached-by-the-house-in-historic-rebuke
[21] National Public Radio (NPR). 2019. Recap: 1st Week Of Impeachment
Hearings. https://www.npr.org/2019/11/16/780160290/recap-1st-week-of-
impeachment-hearings
[22] Diogo Pacheco, Pik-Mai Hui, Christopher Torres-Lugo, Bao Tran Truong, Alessan-
dro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer. 2020. Uncovering Coordinated Networks on
Social Media. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.05658 (2020).
[23] Alexa Pavliuc. 2020. Watch Six Decade-long Disinformation Operations Unfold in
Six Minutes. https://medium.com/swlh/watch-six-decade-long-disinformation-
operations-unfold-in-six-minutes-5f69a7e75fb3
[24] Fabian Pedregosa, Gaël Varoquaux, Alexandre Gramfort, Vincent Michel,
Bertrand Thirion, Olivier Grisel, Mathieu Blondel, Peter Prettenhofer, Ron
Weiss, Vincent Dubourg, Jake Vanderplas, Alexandre Passos, David Cournapeau,
Matthieu Brucher, Matthieu Perrot, and Édouard Duchesnay. 2011. Scikit-Learn:
Machine Learning in Python. Journal of Machine Learning Research (2011).
[25] Washington Post. 2018. Update: Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential
election. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/08/21/russian-
iran-created-facebook-pages-groups-accounts-mislead-users-around-world-
company-says/
[26] Jacob Ratkiewicz, Michael Conover, Mark Meiss, Bruno Gonçalves, Snehal Patil,
Alessandro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer. 2011. Truthy: mapping the spread of
astroturf in microblog streams. In Proceedings of the 20th international conference
companion on World wide web. 249–252.
[27] Jacob Ratkiewicz, Michael D Conover, Mark Meiss, Bruno Gonçalves, Alessandro
Flammini, and Filippo Menczer Menczer. 2011. Detecting and tracking political
abuse in social media. In Fifth international AAAI conference on weblogs and social
media.
[28] Adrian Rauchfleisch and Jonas Kaiser. 2020. The False Positive Problem of
Automatic Bot Detection in Social Science Research. Berkman Klein Center
Research Publication 2020-3 (2020).
[29] Stephen A Ross. 1973. The economic theory of agency: The principal’s problem.
The American economic review 63, 2 (1973), 134–139.
[30] Robin Sommer and Vern Paxson. 2010. Outside the Closed World: On Using
Machine Learning for Network Intrusion Detection. In 2010 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy. IEEE, 305–316.
[31] Kate Starbird, Ahmer Arif, and Tom Wilson. 2019. Disinformation as Collabora-
tiveWork: Surfacing the Participatory Nature of Strategic Information Operations.
Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3, CSCW (2019), 1–26.
[32] Kate Starbird, Dharma Dailey, Owla Mohamed, Gina Lee, and Emma S Spiro.
2018. Engage early, correct more: How journalists participate in false rumors
online during crisis events. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI conference on human
factors in computing systems. 1–12.
[33] Leo G Stewart, Ahmer Arif, and Kate Starbird. 2018. Examining trolls and
polarization with a retweet network.
[34] Gianluca Stringhini, PierreMourlanne, Gregoire Jacob,Manuel Egele, Christopher
Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna. 2015. EVILCOHORT: Detecting Communities of
Malicious Accounts on Online Services. In 24th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 15). 563–578.
[35] Michael E Tipping and Christopher M Bishop. 1999. Probabilistic principal
component analysis. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical
Methodology) 61, 3 (1999), 611–622.
[36] Twitter. 2020. Election Integrity Hub. https://transparency.twitter.com/en/
information-operations.html
[37] Onur Varol, Clayton A Davis, Filippo Menczer, and Alessandro Flammini. 2018.
Feature engineering for social bot detection. Feature Engineering for Machine
Learning and Data Analytics, 311–334.
[38] Onur Varol, Emilio Ferrara, Clayton A Davis, Filippo Menczer, and Alessandro
Flammini. 2017. Online human-bot interactions: Detection, estimation, and
characterization. In International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media.
[39] BinghuiWang, Jinyuan Jia, and Neil Zhenqiang Gong. 2019. Graph-based security
and privacy analytics via collective classification with joint weight learning and
propagation. Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium (2019).
[40] Tom Wilson and Kate Starbird. 2020. Cross-platform disinformation campaigns:
lessons learned and next steps. Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review
1, 1 (2020).
[41] Kai-Cheng Yang, Onur Varol, Pik-Mai Hui, and Filippo Menczer. 2019. Scalable
and generalizable social bot detection through data selection. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1911.09179 (2019).
[42] Xinxin Yang, Bo-Chiuan Chen, Mrinmoy Maity, and Emilio Ferrara. 2016. So-
cial politics: Agenda setting and political communication on social media. In
International Conference on Social Informatics. Springer, 330–344.
[43] Savvas Zannettou, Barry Bradlyn, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Gianluca Stringhini,
and Jeremy Blackburn. 2020. Characterizing the Use of Images by State-Sponsored
Troll Accounts on Twitter. The International AAAI Conference on Web and Social
Media (2020).
[44] Savvas Zannettou, Tristan Caulfield, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Nicolas Kourtelris,
Ilias Leontiadis, Michael Sirivianos, Gianluca Stringhini, and Jeremy Blackburn.
2017. The web centipede: understanding how web communities influence each
other through the lens of mainstream and alternative news sources. In Proceedings
of the 2017 Internet Measurement Conference. 405–417.
[45] Savvas Zannettou, Tristan Caulfield, William Setzer, Michael Sirivianos, Gianluca
Stringhini, and Jeremy Blackburn. 2019. Who Let The Trolls Out?: Towards
Understanding State-Sponsored Trolls. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference
on Web Science. ACM, 353–362.
[46] Haizhong Zheng, Minhui Xue, Hao Lu, Shuang Hao, Haojin Zhu, Xiaohui Liang,
and Keith Ross. 2019. Smoke Screener or Straight Shooter: Detecting Elite
Sybil Attacks in User-Review Social Networks. Network and Distributed Systems
Security (NDSS) Symposium (2019).
13
Disinformation Campaign Release Date
China→ Hong Kong August 2019
September 2019
Iran→ Geopolitics June 2019
Russia (IRA)→ USA October 2018
January 2019
June 2019
UAE→ Qatar/Yemen September 2019
Iran→ USA October 2018
January 2018
Venezuela→ Venezuela January 2019
Ecuador→ Ecuador September 2019
Venezuela (commercial)→ Venezuela January 2019
June 2019
UAE/Egypt→ Qatar/Iran September 2019
Catalonia→ Spain June 2019
Table 6: This table shows how we mapped the data release
from Twitter’s Election Integrity Hub to the disinformation
campaign in our study.
A APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we first show howwemap the data from Twitter’s
Election Integrity archives [36] to the source/target disinformation
campaign labels used in the study (Table 6). Next, in Figure 8, we
show the high-level coordinated activity of the remaining disinfor-
mation campaigns and baselines that are not shown in Figure 2.
Finally, Figure 9 shows the P-R curves at varying levels of time
thresholding (e.g., 5, 10 minutes).
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Figure 8: This Figure shows the coordination patterns of the remaining eight disinformation campaigns and the two commu-
nity baselines not shown in Section 5. Note the y-axis are not the same values for different campaigns.
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Figure 9: P-R Curves for daily/weekly 5-minute and 10-minutemodels. Models shown are the ones that are closest to themean
PR-AUC score across the 10 folds.
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